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Psychology of Trust: A Three Component Analytical Framework to 
Explain the Impact of Formal Institutions on Social Trust Formation 
 
 
ABSTRACT 
Drawing on a social-cognitive theory of psychology, this study introduces a new 
conceptual framework to explain trust building by individuals and the role that formal 
rules and laws may play in this process. Trust is viewed as composed of cultural, 
communal, and contextual components, with the latter encompassing formal 
institutions. We demonstrate that the contextual component measured through three 
institutional indexes is the strongest predictor of social trust that may not only 
condition the importance of cultural and communal components for the process of 
trust formation, but also trigger changes in them. We also furnish evidence that this 
impact may vary across formal institutional types and suggest that the autonomy 
dimension of the institutional framework is particularly important for social trust 
building.  
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Psychology of Trust: A Three Component Analytical Framework to 
Explain the Impact of Formal Institutions on Social Trust Formation 
 
The classical approach considers trust as a cultural attribute that is influenced by an 
individual's internal values formed during early socialization processes (Fukuyama 
2000; Putnam 1995, 2000). Recent studies dissociate trust building from an 
individual's personal attributes and externalize it to contexts within which trust 
formation processes unfold (Nooteboom 2007; Rothstein and Stolle 2001). Many 
refer to formal institutions as one such contextual factor (Farrell 2005; Farrell and 
Knight 2003).  
The sociological analysis of institutional contexts' impact on trust is drawn 
upon a twofold definition of institutions. On the one hand, institutions are viewed as a 
set of public organizations that individuals interact with over the course of their lives. 
The process of trust formation proves affected by such organizations when citizens 
evaluate the quality of their performance (Edlund 2006; Mishler and Rose 2001) or 
that of elected officials (Thomas 1998). A positive experience with them motivates 
individuals to exhibit more trust towards these institutions and other people (Letki 
2006; Murphy 2004; Tyler 2006). In eliciting trust, public authorities' trustworthiness 
does not need to be objectively valid. Rather, what matters is the perception that 
citizens have regarding these organizations (Levi 1998; Scholz and Lubell 1998; 
Steinmo 1993). 
On the other hand, institutions are considered as a set of rules that define legal 
boundaries within which individuals are allowed – and expected – to act. Efficient 
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formal institutions are deemed to be conducive to establishing trust since they enforce 
third-party agreements (Herreros and Criado 2008). They enable individuals to pursue 
redress and restitution when cheated, thereby reducing the risk involved in trusting 
someone (Rothstein and Stolle 2001; Tillmar and Lindkvist 2007) and serving as a 
safety net for those who suffer because of others' dishonest behavior (Farrell 2005). If 
sanctions and penalties are imposed when a contract is breached, formal institutions 
may increase the cost of betrayal (Bohnet and Baytelman 2007) and overcome the 
information deficit problem by indicating what the likely actions of others will be 
(Farrell and Knight 2003). Formal institutions' impact is especially strong when 
formal rules are duly enforced (Oskarsson, Öberg, and Svensson 2009) and perceived 
by individuals as being fairly applied to various population groups (Oskarsson et al. 
2009). 
Despite the fact that both strands find empirical evidence for a positive 
relationship between the quality of formal institutions and trust levels, they exhibit a 
common deficiency: A clear formalization of the mechanisms through which formal 
institutional contexts impact trust is lacking. Several competing theories describe how 
trust emerges but none offers a clear conceptual framework that would integrate 
cultural and contextual determinants into a single analytical framework. Instead, most 
empirical studies either solely examine whether associations exist between trust levels 
and institutional scores while controlling for the socio-demographic characteristics of 
respondents (Herreros and Criado 2008). Or, they offer mathematical models, derived 
from the rational choice perspective (Zak and Knack 2001), which do not account for 
non-cognitive (cultural) forces beyond rational thinking that underlie an individual's 
decision-making regarding whether or not to trust. In both cases, it becomes 
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impossible to establish the complete set of channels through which formal institutions 
affect the trust formation process.  
In addition, there is a problem of uni-dimensionality regarding the definition 
of institutions when they are limited to formal rules and laws. Institutional economics 
distinguishes between multiple types of institutions (Lim and Decker 2007; Persson 
and Tabellini 1994). By contrast, sociology's theoretical and empirical studies on trust 
rarely provide a precise conceptualization concerning the kinds of institutions they 
analyze, thereby implying that all formal rules and laws are equally important to 
interpersonal trust. This might not necessarily be true since particular formal rules 
often only regulate certain aspects of societal arrangements and each of them may 
affect only specific features of an individual's behavior. The institutional impact on 
trust is hence likely to be heterogeneous across different formal institutions. Ignoring 
this may lead to the false conclusion regarding which institutions actually matter in 
eliciting interpersonal trust and to what extent each of them does so.  
This research's main objective is to introduce a new comprehensive model of 
trust formation by drawing on various theories of psychology. Since trust formation is 
governed by brain structures and represents a mental operation, we argue that 
psychology can offer a solid analytical framework to explain trust emergence and 
formal institutions' role in this process. Psychology can also allow the analysis to 
integrate cultural and contextual theories of trust building by addressing cognitive and 
non-cognitive, conscious and subconscious mechanisms of an individual's decision-
making  simultaneously. 
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LITERATURE OVERVIEW  
Psychology's point of departure is that every individual defines their own behavior 
based on an organized mental representation (scheme) of how an individual with 
certain values is likely to think, feel, and act (Shao, Aquino, and Freeman 2008), so 
called moral identity (Bandura 1991, 2001; Higgins 1996; Narvaez et al. 2006; Shao 
et al. 2008). The individual is believed to possess multiple and sometimes competing 
value identities that might not exist chaotically but prove organized according to one's 
internal understanding of the world. However, only one moral identity can be 
activated for processing social information at any given moment (Markus and Kunda 
1986) and hence mapped on the action (Higgins 1996). Which one is eventually 
activated depends on many factors, including the environment within which the 
individual acts (Bargh et al. 1986; Shao et al. 2008).   
The interaction with the environment unfolds through one's perceptual system 
and presupposes the collection of perceptual input. This perceptual input serves as a 
cue to retrieve the appropriate knowledge of action from the memory by activating the 
mental representation within which this knowledge is stored (Prinz 1997). The 
coupling between perceived input and knowledge of action becomes possible because 
mental representations are not stored in the individual's memory as mere facts but are 
augmented with (a) preconditions under which they can be carried out and (b) a 
representation of their expected outcomes (Taatgen et al. 2008). The perceptual input 
is used by the individual to align the observed conditions in the world with the 
preconditions and outcomes of mental representations. The mental representation 
whose preconditions and expected outcomes match the perceptual input is selected for 
mapping on action (Taatgen et al. 2008). 
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Psychology identifies several major problems that may arise in the interaction 
with the environment. First, not all the information can be available in the world. In 
this case, the choice of mental representation leading to the action is governed by the 
individual's internal understanding of the world (Taatgen 2005, 2007). Second, the 
mental representation containing the necessary contextual characteristics as a 
precondition might not be present in the declarative memory. Experiments show that 
in this case, participants simply discover the relevant knowledge by taking a random 
action and observing whether this action brings them closer to the goal. Once the 
correct action is picked, a new record (mental representation) will be created with the 
original perceptual state as precondition and the resulted perceptual state as post-
condition (Taatgen et al. 2008).  
Under such circumstances, a great role may be played by observing the 
behavioral patterns of others. If regarding others gives the perception that acting in 
this particular manner may bring the individual closer to their goal than the random 
selection of the action is limited to copying others' modes of behavior or actions. This 
means that the knowledge containing the desired pattern of behavior is more likely to 
be formed if this mode of behavior is more common among individuals and hence 
often observable in the given institutional contexts.  
Psychology further recognizes the possibility of the feedback mechanism in 
relationship between the own behavior and "regarding others". It is believed that one's 
personal experiences may prompt an individual to expect that others may hold similar 
views or act in a similar way as a result of a similar experience (Lewis and Weigert 
1985; Jones 1996; Nooteboom 2007). The individual affected by the context may 
hence make references from their own experiences to others (Nooteboom 2007) and 
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expect that the contextual impact on others' behavior will be similar to what they 
themselves experienced. This may reshape one's perception of others and result, for 
instance, in considering other people as more honest and law-obedient in the presence 
of effective formal institutions. 
Finally, the theories of psychology to some extent elaborate on the kind of 
contextual characteristics that can impact the formation of mental representations or 
the process of their retrieval from the declarative memory. Three features of the 
institutional context are usually emphasized: (1) sanctions, (2) legitimacy, and (3) 
autonomy. The sanction hypothesis assumes that the public perceives stronger 
sanctions in legal instruments as a signal that dishonest behavior deserves greater 
moral condemnation (Feldman and Perez 2009; White 2002). Strong sanctions will 
likely cause people to feel that the prohibited act is morally problematic (Bandura 
1999; Paternoster and Simpson 1996), as a result of which the mental representations 
relating to honest behavior may be activated, and good values will be enacted in 
behavior. Psychology further suggests that laws are an external factor designed and 
implemented by the government and hence the public. However, the understanding, 
interpretation, and enforcement of such laws in practice are personal (White 2002). 
The legitimacy of formal rules or laws and the level of autonomy they promote may 
influence people's interpretation of these formal institutions (Kohlberg 1981; White 
2002). The legitimacy hypothesis suggests that individuals tend to comply with the 
law and will act in a trustworthy way if they consider a particular law legitimate 
(Feldman and Perez 2009) achieved through enhanced citizen participation in creating 
formal rules (Feldman and Perez 2009) or enabling information to be available about 
the formation of such rules. The autonomy hypothesis presupposes that if formal rules 
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and laws promote autonomy and independence, then individuals are encouraged to 
use good values in their behavior. More autonomy is believed to strengthen the 
personal ego, and people with strong egos rarely develop poor values or deviate from 
good beliefs and morals in their behavior (White 2002). Conversely, authoritarian 
rules or regimes with rigidly hierarchical organizations prove to retard values 
enactment or development (Kohlberg 1981).  
 
ANALYTICAL FRAMEWORK 
We use the above overview of findings from psychology to introduce a simplistic 
model of trust building. Since psychology suggests that the individuals behavior is 
determined by (1) available set of value identities, (2) others-regarding, and (3) 
contextual characteristics, we propose that trust as an actual behavior can be viewed 
as consistent of three components, with each formed through one of the above factors: 
(1) a crystallized component, (2) a communal component, and (3) a contextual 
component.  
The cultural component refers to an individual's set of values identities that 
represent one's knowledge about various levels of trust to be exhibited towards others 
given certain circumstances. This knowledge is expected  to be formed as the brain 
records embedded within mental representations and shaped by both culture prevalent 
in one's society and one's life-long experience with trusting other people. The 
communal component is derived from regarding others and refers to the perception of 
other people whom trust is to be exhibited. We believe that on the one hand, it is 
formed through the direct interaction with others and may also include the evaluation 
of others' trustworthiness in the course of deciding which level of trust to display, if 
10 
 
any.  On the other hand, the communal component includes the extrapolation of own 
experiences' effects on one's own behavior to the behavior of others, resulting in the 
formation of expectations about other people's actions. The contextual component 
relates to the institutional context within which the decision about trust levels is made. 
This context is expected to subject all the individuals to the same set of formal rules 
that may potentially influence trust formation. The contextual trust component is 
formed through the activation of rational mechanisms and conscious considerations 
and involves evaluating the quality of this context and estimating probable 
consequences from acting in a certain manner within this context.     
Drawn upon this approach, trust formation process unfolds as follows. The 
individual that possesses a number of mental representations with each storing 
information about trusting others to a certain degree and augmented with (a) the 
precondition specifying under which contextual circumstances each particular level of 
trust should be displayed and (b) the expected outcome of exhibiting this certain level 
of trust. In choosing which mental representation to activate and hence which level of 
trust to exhibit, the individual evaluates the context in which he or she is placed. The 
perceived properties of the context are matched to the preconditions of mental 
representations. The one that corresponds to the match criteria will be selected and the 
level of trust stored in this mental representation will be displayed.  If there is no 
match found, the individual randomly selects the level of trust to be exhibited. It will 
be stored as a new mental representation if the new level of trust is sufficient to bring 
the individual closer to their goals.  
The above understanding of the trust formation process allows us to offer the 
following propositions. Proposition 1: We expect that the positive impact of the 
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cultural component on trust in improving institutional contexts is stronger for those 
individuals who already possess mental representations related to exhibiting 
sufficiently high levels of trust. This is because good institutional context may 
encourage trust by activating the relevant mental representation and hence in order to 
become active, such mental representations should be already possessed by the 
individual. The encoding of a new mental representation is by contrast seen as a slow 
process for two reasons. First, it involves a random selection of trust levels and a 
further analysis of this action's consequences. Since this process is likely to involve 
errors, it may take more time before the right level of trust is found, if any, and stored 
as a new record in brain. Second, the new knowledge that will be encoded is usually 
derived through drawing analogies with the knowledge that the individual currently 
possesses. Learning is viewed as a cumulative process whereas the stock of new 
knowledge proves a function of already existing knowledge. A sudden leap from 
distrust to complete trust is hence highly unlikely to occur but rather a gradual 
increase in trust levels by choosing more and more trust to display through the 
random selection process of learning.  
Proposition 2: Improving institutional contexts may trigger the process that at 
a country level looks similar to values crowding out. The improving institutional 
context stimulates the activation of mental representations containing high trust levels 
or by triggering the formation of new mental representations that embed trust levels 
higher than the individual is used to have. We expect that when the mental 
representation with the optimal level of trust is already in place and should only be 
activated, this trust level is embedded within a complex value identity unit and is 
derived from certain values internalized by the individual that underlie one's belief of 
12 
 
how to act under certain circumstances. This complexity manifests itself through the 
diversity of aspects of one's behavior that is covered by a value identity unit. For 
instance, the value of altruism may be embedded within a value identity that specifies 
one's belief regarding the extent to which the one should help others, care for others 
trust others, or set other people's well-being over own. When the existing values do 
not contain the optimal level of trust, the individual will have to learn to trust as 
psychology suggests. This learning process might however be relatively simple in 
nature sine it involves a mere choice of the level of trust to display without linking it 
to one' values that would internally support this level of trust. The new mental 
representation will highly unlikely to be a value identity but a simple record of 
knowledge suggesting that exhibiting this level of trust under these type of 
circumstances will bring these kind of outcomes. No record of how much the one 
should help others, are for others or the like will be created in parallel with the trust 
level record. The improving institutional context may hence suppress value formation 
(viewed as value identities) with a simple knowledge of how to act in the given 
situation. One should note that in the countries where initial values contain 
insufficient levels of trust, improvements in formal institutions will trigger a more 
intense process of value crowding out through the formation of simple knowledge of 
how to act.  
Proposition 3: We also expect that improving institutional contexts may 
change the communal component's role in defining the level of trust. This shift 
manifests itself through reinforcing the positive impact that regarding others as 
trustworthy has on trust levels or through suppressing the negative impact of viewing 
others as untrustworthy when choosing the level of trust to display. The rationale 
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behind our argument is that the individual, who himself experienced the positive 
change in own behavior as a result of the strong institutional context, may expect that 
these formal institutions will change others' behavioral pattern in the same way. This 
extrapolation of own experience to others' behavior may create an expectation that 
others to whom trust is to be displaced will act more honestly in strong institutional 
contexts. The individual's perception of others as untrustworthy can therefore still 
result in displaying trust towards them if formal institutions are well defined and 
enforced efficiently. Alternatively, one's perception of others as relatively trustworthy 
may results in higher levels of trust if a strong institutional framework exists in the 
country.  
Proposition 4: We also expect that in the long run, this extrapolation 
experience can lead to positive shifts in the communal component through 
reconsidering the level of trust that should be displayed for each level of perceived 
trustworthiness. If the expectation about others' behavior in the strong institutional 
context will be justified by a positive outcome of the interaction with other people, 
then the individual will gradually create a new record that would contain new match 
scale between the level of perceived trustworthiness and the level of trust to be 
displayed by leveling up trust for each degree of perceived trustworthiness.  
We use the above observations to postulate our hypotheses:  
Hypothesis 1: Individuals that possess larger values for any of the three components 
will also have higher trust scores.  
Hypothesis 2: The contextual component's impact on trust will be greater for those 
individuals that have better cultural and communal components. 
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Hypothesis 3: The cultural component's impact on social trust will be weaker in 
countries where the institutional context is stronger.   
Hypothesis 4: The communal component's impact on social trust will be stronger in 
countries where the institutional context is stronger.  
Hypothesis 5: An improvement in the contextual component is expected to lead to 
shifts in the cultural and communal components. 
 
DATA AND METHODS DESCRIPTION  
Our empirical analysis is based on the European Social Survey (ESS) for the year 
2004, with a total of 25 countries included. The variables are operationalized as 
follows (see Appendix 1 for descriptive statistics).  
 
Dependent Variable  
Social trust is measured through the conventional question: "Generally speaking, 
would you say that most people can be trusted or that you cannot be too careful in 
dealing with people?", with the response scale ranging from 0 "cannot be trusted at 
all" to 10 "can be fully trusted."  
 
Independent Variables  
The cultural component variable is constructed based on responses to 21 questions 
asking one's perception of how important various values or attitudes are to the 
respondent. Each item is measured on a six point scale ranging from 1 "very much like 
me" to 6 "not like me at all." We use a principle component factor analysis to combine 
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these items into three constructs by summing up their values. Table 1 provides 
information about the division of items among the three constructs. The first reflects 
one's general behavioral values regarding others, government and society. The second 
captures one's level of altruism and sympathy with others. The third refers to one's 
preference for leisure.  
 
Table 1 near here 
 
The communal component is measured by the question asking how worried 
the respondent is of being treated dishonestly. We expect that the extent to which an 
individual worries about dishonest treatment is a function of the individual's 
perception of others formed through interactions with people. The response scale 
varies from 1 "very worried " to 4 "not at all."  
In choosing operationalizations for the contextual component, we use the three 
contextual features. We associate the sanction feature with legal institutions, such as 
the protection of property rights and contract enforcement legislation since they 
achieve their main objectives of lowering transaction costs by detecting and 
sanctioning improper economic behavior (Troilo 2011). Political institutions are 
linked to the legitimacy mechanism since they reflect the quality of the political 
system and democratic principles and hence measure the extent to which citizens can 
participate in the political processes (Acemoglu and Robinson 2012). Regulatory 
institutions relate to the autonomy mechanism, since they set constraints on an 
individual's economic decision-making in the labor market, credit markets, etc. 
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(Jalilian, Kirkpatrick, and Parker 2007), and may therefore influence an individual's 
perception of how much autonomy is permitted regarding economic behavior.  
We operationalized political institutions through the average of three World 
Bank Group institutional indexes reflecting the properties of a country's political 
system: voice and accountability, government effectiveness, and corruption control in 
government. Each item has values ranging from -2.5 "poor political institutions" to 
2.5 "very good political institutions." Economic institutions are measured through a 
contract enforcement and property rights protection index measured on a ten-point 
scale with higher values corresponding to better institutions. The data are sourced 
from the 2007 annual report of Economic Freedom of the World (Gwartney et al. 
2007). Regulatory institutions are measured by a regulation of labor, credit, and 
business index constructed by Economic Freedom of the World (Gwartney et al. 
2007) with values varying from 1 "entirely regulated" to 10 "entirely independent 
from regulation". We average out all institutional indexes over three years (2003-
2005) and re-scale them so that the final constructs have values between 0 "poor 
formal institutions" and 1 "good formal institutions."  
 
Control Variables  
The set of control variables includes the conventional determinants of trust: the 
frequency of meeting friends, number of years completed in full-time education, 
respondents’ gender, actual age, and household income. In addition, we include 
dummies specifying whether respondents have a paid job and whether they were born 
in the country they reside. We also control for respondents' level of political trust 
calculated as the sum of responses to questions asking how much trust an individual 
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has in (1) country's parliament, (2) the legal system, (3) the police, (4) politicians, (5) 
political parties, with responses to each item ranging from 0 "no trust at all" to 10 
"complete trust." 
We test our hypotheses empirically by using three strategies. Strategy 1: We 
seek to demonstrate that the three components relate to trust (Hypothesis 1). The main 
method of analysis is multilevel modeling that accounts for the hierarchical structure 
of our data and hence prevents the un-modeled country information from being 
pooled into the single individual error term (Kreft and Leeuw 1998; Luke 2004; 
Snijders and Bosker 1999). The base model takes the following form: 
Tij = γ00 + γ10Cultural_Cij + γ20Communal_Cij + γ01Contextual_Cj + γ30Xij + 
moj + εij                                                                                                                                                                                      (1)                              
Here, Tij stands for individual level of social trust. Cultural_Cij and 
Communal_Cij are measures of the cultural and communal components, respectively.  
Contextual_Cj captures the three types of formal institutions that will sequentially be 
included in the model, X ij  is a set of control variables, moj is the variance at the 
country level, and εij is the variance at the individual level. We use STATA command 
GLLAMM for calculating the parameters of the model.  
Strategy 2: We analyze the impact of formal institutions on cross-country 
variations in the coefficient estimates on the cultural and communal component 
variables of trust regressions (Hypothesis 2). In doing so, we first estimate the below 
trust regression individually for each country by applying the standard OLS 
procedure: 
Tij = α0j + α1j Cultural_Cij + α2jCommunal_Cij + α3jXij + εij                                        (2)                                        
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The estimated coefficients on the two components are further regressed on the 
institutional scores for the aggregated dataset constructed by calculating countries' 
averages: 
α1j = β0 + β1Contextual_Cj + β2Xj+ ∂j                                                                                              (3)                                        
 α2j = δ0 + δ1Contextual_Cj + δ2Xj+ ∂j                                                                                              (4)                                                                            
where Cultural_C, Communal_C and Contextual_C are the three components 
as previously mentioned. α is the coefficients measuring the country-specific impact 
of cultural and communal components on trust. The α-regressions also contain control 
variables that capture countries' experience with poverty, learning, employment 
patterns, and religion. A country's extent of poverty is measured by the risk of poverty 
before social transfers sourced from EUROSTAT. Learning patterns are 
operationalized through a country mean to the question that takes value of one if the 
respondent participates in any lifelong learning activities in the last 12 months. A 
country's mean number of hours worked by respondents on a typical weekend sourced 
from the ESS relevant questions is believed to measure countries' prevalent work 
patterns. We further include the percentage of population adhering to Protestant and 
Catholic religions. In the case of the communal component, we additionally control 
for the quality of labor market institutions captured by a EUROSTAT gender pay gap 
index and the extent of the population ageing process expressed through a country's 
average age of respondents in the sample.  
Strategy 3: We check if improvements in the contextual component may lead 
to a positive change in the two other components (Hypothesis 3).  We start the 
analysis by constructing a single measure for the cultural component by using STATA 
predict option for factor analysis. We employ a simultaneous equation model which 
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can run several regressions simultaneously assuming that there is a certain cross-
equation correlation. The set of equations includes a cross-country trust equation and 
three channel equations: one for the country's cultural component, one for the 
communal component and one for the contextual component. We use instrumental 
variables estimation to ensure that our structural parameters are identified. The 
cultural component is instrumented through the early socialization experience at 
childhood which is believed to be shaped by mother and hence measured through 
mother's level of education. We also use the perception of wrong as an instrument for 
values and operationalized it through the average of two ESS questions asking 
whether it is alright to occasionally ignore the law and do what you want to make 
money. The responses vary from 1 "strongly agree " to 2 "strongly disagree". The 
communal component is instrumented through past experience with other people and 
measured through the question: "In the last five years, how often did a 
plumber/builder/mechanic/repairer overcharge you?" The responses vary from 
1"never" to 5 "more than five times." Regarding the contextual component, La Porta 
et al. (1999) argue that legal origins of a country's legislation can be used as an 
instrument for legal institutions. Fidrmuc (2003) suggests that one can instrument 
political institutions with the index of civil liberties. Mauro (1995) demonstrates that 
fractionalization indexes are good instruments for institutional scores. We utilize this 
approach for regulatory institutions.  
We also include other control variables in the channel equations: percentage of 
female students, language fractionalization, countries' unemployment rates and 
education patterns measured through the aggregated ESS question about the number 
of years that respondents spend in full time education. In the case of institutional 
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indexes we control for experience  with socialism (the dummy takes the value of 1 if 
yes), political stability sourced from Word Bank on-line database, percentage of 
Protestants in a country, and the extent of rent-seeking measured through a corruption 
perception index calculated by Transparency International Organization. The overall 
number of inclusions is sufficient to satisfy the order condition for identification. We 
estimate the full set of equations jointly by applying the STATA command reg3 to the 
aggregated data-set which is obtained by calculating the countries' mean values for all 
the variables. 
 
ANALYSIS AND RESULTS 
The empirical analysis supports our 3-C component model of trust formation. Table 1 
suggests that the cultural and communal components are strong predictors of social 
trust. The contextual component proves particularly important for explaining the 
cross-country variations in trust scores, with coefficient estimates on the institutional 
variables varying, however, across types of institutions. Regulatory institutions that 
capture the extent of overall economic freedom in a country have been found to have 
the strongest impact on trust levels. The logic of our findings does not change after 
including the standard set of controls for social trust or instrumenting the institutional 
variables to eliminate the endogeneity problem in the trust regressions (see Tables 3).   
 
Table 2 and Table 3 near here 
 
We also detect cross-level interactions between the contextual component and 
the two other components of trust when running the individual-level analysis. Political 
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and economic institutions are found to primarily condition the communal component's 
impact on trust, by reinforcing the positive impact that the perception of others as 
trustworthy has on trust scores. By contrast, regulatory institutions prove important 
for enhancing the positive impact of altruism or sympathy with others on trust levels 
and to a lesser extent interact with the communal component. We also find that the 
three institutional measures enhance the effect of high preference for leisure on 
trusting others.   
 
Table 4 near here 
 
The country specific analysis reveals that the impact of cultures and others-
regarding on trust scores is not universal across countries but considerably varies (see 
Appendix 2), further confirming that the context might also matter for their overall 
importance in trust building processes. Regressing the two coefficient estimates on the 
contextual component provides results that are in line with our expectation: The 
cultural component's impact on social trust is weaker in countries where the 
institutional context is stronger. Similar to growth research (Ahlerup, Olsson, and 
Yanagizawa 2009), culture proves particularly important for social trust formation in 
the countries with poorly defined or enforced formal institutions, with its role 
declining as the legal framework improves. 
A strong institutional contexts however reinforces the communal component's 
role in trust formation and hence the same perception of others will produce greater 
trust in countries where the institutional context is better. The analysis also confirms 
the previous findings that the effect of the communal component on social trust is 
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shaped mainly by political and economic institutions and to a less extent by regulatory 
institutions. These results also prove robust to instrumenting formal institutions or 
controlling for the maturity level of cultural scores and the communal measure in the 
countries of our sample.  
 
Tables 5, 6, 7, 8 near here 
 
In the long run, one can also expect that formal institutions may suppress the 
development of cultural values traditionally relevant to social trust but prompt 
individuals to perceive others as more trustworthy in their behavior. Interestingly, the 
simultaneous equation model does not reveal a direct effect of institutions on social 
trust (with the exception of regulatory institutions) but rather suggests that trust is 
shaped by formal institutions through values and the perception of others. Again, we 
detect certain heterogeneity in this respect: Political and legislative institutions are 
found to be a strong determinant of perception of others, but still lead to a value 
revision process. Regulatory institutions, by contrast, have a weaker effect on the 
communal component in terms of statistical significance but a strongly statistically 
significant effect on values. This type of formal institutions is also the only one that 
conducts a direct effect on trust levels. The autonomy dimension of formal 
institutional frameworks seems to be particularly important for trust formation. Trust 
is more likely to emerge where more autonomy in the economic decision-making is 
permitted by the government.  
 
Table 9 near here 
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CONCLUSION AND DISCUSSION  
Overall, our study supports the new conceptual framework of trust formation  
derived from social-cognitive theories of behavior. Trust should be viewed as 
composed of people's values, their perception of others, and the properties of the 
context in which they act. Formal institutions prove an important element of this 
context and may influence trust in a threefold manner: by (1) imposing sanctions on 
those who deviate from rules, (2) ensuring legitimacy of rules introduced, and (3) 
allowing citizens some degree of autonomy in their economic decision-making.  
We also detects two peculiarities in the impact of contexts on social trust. 
First, the institutional context's impact on trust proves heterogeneous across types of  
formal institutions. Regulatory institutions are found to be the strongest predictor of 
trusting others. Second, the institutional context may correlate with the extent to 
which the cultural and communal components shape individual trust. In the long-run, 
a strong institutional framework may positively affect the regarding of others as 
trustworthy, but retard the formation of values that traditionally relate to high trust.   
Further research is needed to eliminate two major drawbacks of our study. On 
the one hand, an alternative set of operationalizations should be found for each of the 
three components to further validate the complex structure of trust proposed by our 
model. Second, it is necessary to check the dynamic nature of the relationship 
between the three components and social trust by testing the proposed analytical 
framework with longitudinal data.  
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Table 1. Factor loadings for values component  
Item name 
The cultural component 
General 
behavioral 
values 
Altruism and 
sympathy with 
others 
Preference for 
leisure 
Important to seek fun and things that give pleasure   0.593 
Important to follow traditions and customs 0.604   
Important to care for nature and environment  0.579  
Important to be loyal to friends and devoted to people close  0.608  
Important to get respect from others 0.478   
Important to behave properly 0.691   
Important to seek adventures and have an exiting life   0.656 
Important that government provides security 0.603   
Important to be successful and that people recognize 
achievements  
  0.744 
Important to help others and care for others' well-being  0.618  
Important to make own decisions and be free  0.426  
Important to have a good time   0.567 
Important to be humble and modest, not draw attention 0.441   
Important to understand different people  0.669  
Important to do what is told and follow rules 0.632   
Important to try new and different things in life   0.525 
Important to live in secure and safe surroundings 0.629   
Important to show abilities and be admired   0.696 
Important that people are treated equally and have equal 
opportunities 
 0.597  
Important to be rich, have money and expensive things   0.689 
Important to think new ideas and being  creative  0.423  
 
Notes: Extraction Method: Principal Component Analysis.  Rotation Method: Oblimin with Kaiser 
Normalization.   Rotation converged in 20 iterations. 
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Table 2. Decomposition of trust structure: A three component approach 
 
VARIABLES (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
     
The cultural component      
General behavioral values 0.045*** 0.045*** 0.045*** 0.044*** 0.044*** 
 (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) 
Altruism and sympathy with others -0.047*** -0.048*** -0.0462*** -0.047*** -0.047*** 
 (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) 
Preference for leisure 0.002 -0.001 -0.001 -0.001 -0.001 
 (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) 
The communal component      
Others-regarding   0.411*** 0.400*** 0.402*** 0.416*** 
  (0.014) (0.014) (0.014) (0.014) 
The contextual component       
Political institutions    5.230***   
   (0.101)   
Economic institutions     4.365***  
    (0.092)  
Regulatory institutions      7.264*** 
     (0.153) 
Variance at level 1 5.133 
 
5.011 
 
5.013  5.008 5.013 
 (0.036) (0.035) (0.035) (0.035) (0.035) 
Variance at level 2 0.273  
 
0.248 
 
 0.211 0.158 0.217 
 (0.008) (0.007) (0.009) (0.007) (0.009) 
Number of countries  25 25 25 25 25 
Number of observations 40,935 40,015 40,015 40,015 40,015 
Notes: Standard errors in parentheses. 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 (two-tailed tests)
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Table 3. A three-component approach to trust: A robustness check  
 
VARIABLES (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
      
The cultural component       
General behavioral  0.038*** 0.040*** 0.038*** 0.044*** 0.042*** 0.040*** 
values (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) 
Altruism and sympathy -0.036*** -0.036*** -0.037*** -0.022*** -0.023*** -0.021*** 
with others (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) 
Preference for leisure 0.009*** 0.010*** 0.008*** 0.016*** 0.017*** 0.014*** 
 (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) 
The communal component       
Others-regarding  0.295*** 0.299*** 0.299*** 0.286*** 0.288*** 0.290*** 
 (0.016) (0.016) (0.016) (0.016) (0.016) (0.016) 
The contextual component        
Political institutions  2.488***   2.584***   
 (0.132)   (0.145)   
Economic institutions   2.564***   2.413***  
  (0.116)   (0.126)  
Regulatory institutions    4.021***   5.443*** 
   (0.181)   (0.271) 
Individual-level control 
variables 
      
Meeting friends 0.097*** 0.104*** 0.097*** 0.119*** 0.123*** 0.122*** 
 (0.008) (0.008) (0.008) (0.009) (0.008) (0.008) 
Born in the country 0.079* 0.089* 0.099** 0.096** 0.099** 0.145*** 
 (0.046) (0.046) (0.047) (0.047) (0.047) (0.047) 
Paid job 0.104*** 0.112*** 0.098*** 0.193*** 0.191*** 0.162*** 
 (0.028) (0.028) (0.028) (0.029) (0.029) (0.029) 
Gender (Male =1) -0.039 -0.042* -0.033 -0.007 -0.014 -0.018 
 (0.025) (0.025) (0.025) (0.026) (0.026) (0.026) 
Age 0.006*** 0.006*** 0.006*** 0.009*** 0.008*** 0.008*** 
 (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) 
Years of education  0.053*** 0.054*** 0.051*** 0.081*** 0.078*** 0.073*** 
 (0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.004) 
Household income  0.051*** 0.052*** 0.062*** 0.009 0.019*** 0.026*** 
 (0.006) (0.006) (0.006) (0.007) (0.006) (0.006) 
Political trust 0.071*** 0.071*** 0.072*** 0.072*** 0.072*** 0.072*** 
 (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) 
Variance at level 1 4.387   4.393 4.393    
 (0.036) (0.036) (0.036)    
Variance at level 2 0.170  0.349  0.345    
 (0.009) (0.022) (0.022)    
Number of countries  25 25 25 25 25 25 
Number of observations 29,294 29,294 29,294 29,294 29,294 29,294 
R-squared    0.253 0.255 0.256 
Notes: Standard errors in parentheses. The estimation of models 4, 5 and 6 is conducted by applying 
STATA command ivreg. Formal institutions are instrumented as described in the methodological part 
of the manuscript.  
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 (two-tailed tests) 
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Table 4. Cross-level interactions between trust components, multi-level model 
 
VARIABLES (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
      
The cultural component       
General behavioral values 0.048 0.043*** 0.059 0.042*** 0.115** 0.044*** 
 (0.034) (0.006) (0.035) (0.006) (0.055) (0.005) 
Altruism and sympathy with  0.005 -0.023*** -0.018 -0.023*** 0.008 -0.023*** 
others (0.024) (0.006) (0.025) (0.006) (0.008) (0.006) 
Preference for leisure 0.096*** 0.015** 0.082*** 0.016*** 0.081* 0.015** 
 (0.026) (0.005) (0.028) (0.005) (0.044) (0.005) 
The communal component       
Others-regarding  0.295*** -0.627*** 0.294*** -0.480*** 0.303*** -0.234 
 (0.036) (0.162) (0.039) (0.161) (0.037) (0.311) 
The intrapersonal component        
Political institutions  5.546*** -1.209     
 (1.865) (1.189)     
Economic institutions    4.881*** -0.796   
   (1.627) (1.274)   
Regulatory institutions      8.833*** 1.596 
     (2.504) (1.800) 
Interactions        
Political X General behavioral  -0.006      
values (0.044)      
Political X Altruism and  -0.038      
sympathy with others (0.032)      
Political X Preference for  -0.106***      
leisure (0.033)      
Political X Others-regarding  1.237***     
  (0.210)     
Economic X General    -0.022    
behavioral values   (0.046)    
Economic X Altruism and    -0.009    
sympathy with others   (0.034)    
Economic X Preference for    -0.088**    
leisure   (0.036)    
Economic X Others-regarding    1.054***   
    (0.225)   
Regulatory X General 
behavioral values 
    -0.098  
     (0.079)  
Regulatory X Altruism and      -0.086***  
sympathy with others     (0.015)  
Regulatory X Preference for 
leisure 
    -0.102*  
     (0.059)  
Regulatory X Others-
regarding 
     0.781* 
      (0.440) 
Observations 29,294 29,294 29,294 29,294 29,294 29,294 
Number of countries 25 25 25 25 25 25 
R-squared 0.255 0.257 0.257 0.258 0.260 0.258 
Notes: Standard errors in parentheses. All regressions contain a standard set of control variables, 
including meeting friends, born in the country dummy, paid job dummy, gender dummy, age, years of 
education, household income and political trust.  
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 (two-tailed tests)
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Table 5. Formal institutions and the impact of general behavioral values on trust 
 
VARIABLES (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) 
         
          
Extent of poverty  -0.001 -0.001 -0.001 -0.001 -0.001 -0.001 -0.001 -0.001 -0.001 
 (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) 
Learning patterns 0.003*** 0.003*** 0.003** 0.003*** 0.003** 0.003** 0.002* 0.002 0.002* 
 (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) 
Work patterns -0.054** -0.067** -0.032 -0.0516** -0.063* -0.034 -0.029 -0.042 -0.003 
 (0.022) (0.028) (0.021) (0.023) (0.032) (0.024) (0.029) (0.037) (0.026) 
% of Catholics 0.001** 0.001 0.001* 0.001** 0.001 0.001* 0.001** 0.001* 0.001** 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
Political institutions  -0.179***   -0.167***   -0.163***   
 (0.055)   (0.064)   (0.062)   
Economic institutions   -0.172***   -0.159*   -0.162**  
  (0.065)   (0.082)   (0.079)  
Regulatory institutions    -0.216**   -0.242   -0.337** 
   (0.092)   (0.168)   (0.164) 
Mean for general        0.005 0.005 0.009** 
behavioral values       (0.004) (0.004) (0.004) 
          
Observations 24 24 24 24 24 24 24 24 24 
R-squared 0.518 0.449 0.416 0.517 0.448 0.413 0.562 0.497 0.516 
Notes: Standard errors in parentheses. Models 1 to 3 include the institutional scores and the list of controls; Models 4 to 5 additionally instrument institutional 
measures as described in the methodological part of the manuscript. The STATA ivreg command is used for calculating model parameters; Models 6 to 9 augment 
the previous models by controlling for the maturation level of the cultural subcomponents calculated as countries' mean values.  
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 (two-tailed tests) 
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Table 6. Formal institutions and the impact of altruism and sympathy with others on trust 
 
VARIABLES (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) 
         
          
Extent of poverty  0.002 0.001 0.002 0.002 0.002 0.001 0.002 0.001 0.002 
 (0.001) (0.001) (0.002) (0.001) (0.001) (0.002) (0.001) (0.002) (0.002) 
Learning patterns -0.002* -0.001 0.001 -0.003** -0.002 -0.001 -0.003** -0.003 0.001 
 (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.002) (0.001) (0.002) (0.002) 
Work patterns 0.057* 0.063 0.007 0.069** 0.091* 0.024 0.083** 0.107* 0.008 
 (0.028) (0.037) (0.030) (0.030) (0.044) (0.037) (0.035) (0.058) (0.035) 
% of Catholics -0.001 -0.001 -0.001 -0.001 -0.001 -0.001 -0.001 -0.001 -0.001 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
Political institutions  0.209***   0.261***   0.300***   
 (0.071)   (0.083)   (0.106)   
Economic institutions   0.170*   0.261**   0.303*  
  (0.087)   (0.112)   (0.156)  
Regulatory institutions    -0.046   0.158   -0.001 
   (0.130)   (0.252)   (0.221) 
Mean for altruism and        0.007 0.005 -0.005 
sympathy with others       (0.006) (0.007) (0.006) 
          
Observations 24 24 24 24 24 24 24 24 24 
R-squared 0.377 0.237 0.080 0.358 0.190 0.100 0.415 0.182 0.110 
Notes: Standard errors in parentheses. Models 1 to 3 include the institutional scores and the list of controls; Models 4 to 5 additionally instrument institutional 
measures as described in the methodological part of the manuscript. The STATA ivreg command is used for calculating model parameters; Models 6 to 9 augment 
the previous models by controlling for the maturation level of the cultural subcomponents calculated as countries' mean values.  
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 (two-tailed tests) 
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Table 7. Formal institutions and the impact of preference for leisure on trust 
 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) 
VARIABLES leisure leisure leisure leisure leisure leisure leisure leisure leisure 
          
Extent of poverty  -0.001 -0.001 -0.001 -0.002 -0.001 -0.001 -0.001 -0.001 -0.001 
 (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) 
Learning patterns -0.001 -0.001 -0.001 0.001 -0.001 -0.001 0.001 0.001 -0.001 
 (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) 
Work patterns -0.005 -0.003 0.011 -0.020 -0.013 0.004 -0.037 -0.031 0.003 
 (0.020) (0.024) (0.018) (0.022) (0.028) (0.021) (0.022) (0.028) (0.019) 
% of Catholics -0.001** -0.001*** -0.001*** -0.001** -0.001*** -0.001** -0.001** -0.001*** -0.001*** 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
Political institutions  -0.059   -0.125**   -0.153**   
 (0.050)   (0.061)   (0.057)   
Economic institutions   -0.036   -0.068   -0.094  
  (0.057)   (0.073)   (0.070)  
Regulatory institutions    0.040   -0.046   0.027 
   (0.078)   (0.147)   (0.132) 
Mean for preference for 
leisure 
      -0.007** -0.006** -0.005* 
       (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) 
          
Observations 24 24 24 24 24 24 24 24 24 
R-squared 0.507 0.481 0.477 0.459 0.471 0.442 0.580 0.598 0.556 
Notes: Standard errors in parentheses. Models 1 to 3 include the institutional scores and the list of controls; Models 4 to 5 additionally instrument institutional 
measures as described in the methodological part of the manuscript. The STATA ivreg command is used for calculating model parameters; Models 6 to 9 augment 
the previous models by controlling for the maturation level of the cultural subcomponents calculated as countries' mean values.  
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 (two-tailed tests) 
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Table 8.  Formal institutions and the impact of communal component on trust 
 
VARIABLES (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) 
         
          
% of Catholics -0.003*** -0.003*** -0.003*** -0.003*** -0.003*** -0.003** -0.003*** -0.003*** -0.003** 
 (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) 
Equality in labor markets  -0.013*** -0.015*** -0.016*** -0.014*** -0.015*** -0.017*** -0.014*** -0.015*** -0.018** 
 (0.001) (0.004) (0.005) (0.004) (0.004) (0.005) (0.004) (0.004) (0.006) 
Extent of population ageing  -0.016 -0.018 -0.012 -0.016 -0.018 -0.002 -0.016 -0.019 0.003 
 (0.014) (0.014) (0.017) (0.014) (0.014) (0.019) (0.014) (0.014) (0.022) 
Political institutions  0.584**   0.570**   0.779*   
 (0.248)   (0.267)   (0.375)   
Economic institutions   0.512**   0.504**   0.673**  
  (0.213)   (0.231)   (0.305)  
Regulatory institutions    0.354   0.970   1.358 
   (0.404)   (0.562)   (0.865) 
Mean for communal component        -0.113 -0.093 -0.107 
       (0.130) (0.121) (0.168) 
          
Observations 23 23 23 23 23 23 23 23 23 
R-squared 0.583 0.587 0.477 0.583 0.587 0.410 0.604 0.598 0.329 
Notes: Standard errors in parentheses. Models 1 to 3 include the institutional scores and the list of controls; Models 4 to 5 additionally instrument institutional 
measures as described in the methodological part of the manuscript. The STATA ivreg command is used for calculating model parameters; Models 6 to 9 augment 
the previous models by controlling for the maturation level of the communal component calculated as countries' mean values.  
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 (two-tailed tests)
 Table 9. Decomposition of contextual effects on trust, simultaneous equation model 
 
Variables 
The contextual component 
Political 
institutions 
Economic 
institutions 
Regulatory 
institutions 
The trust equation    
The cultural component 0.505*** 0.517*** 0.327*** 
 (0.108) (0.113) (0.124) 
The communal component 2.533*** 2.499*** 1.890*** 
 (0.565) (0.605) (0.528) 
The contextual component 1.478 1.233 5.965** 
 (1.131) (1.235) (2.332) 
R-squared 0.751 0.759 0.813 
The cultural component equation    
Percentage of female students 0.064*** 0.069*** 0.076*** 
 (0.019) (0.021) (0.021) 
Early socialization 0.761*** 0.687*** 0.755*** 
 (0.153) (0.165) (0.185) 
Perception of  the wrong 2.613*** 2.695*** 2.673*** 
 (0.625) (0.646) (0.639) 
Language fractionalization 1.849*** 1.862*** 1.964*** 
 (0.471) (0.489) (0.592) 
The external component -1.585** -2.098** -4.455** 
 (0.784) (0.843) (2.046) 
R-squared 0.700 0.679 0.712 
The communal component equation    
Unemployment patterns -0.021*** -0.016*** -0.017*** 
 (0.005) (0.005) (0.006) 
Education patters 0.061*** 0.064** 0.076** 
 (0.023) (0.026) (0.033) 
Negative experience with others   -0.783*** -0.796*** -1.050*** 
 (0.249) (0.269) (0.276) 
The external component 0.935*** 1.076*** 1.789** 
 (0.285) (0.316) (0.842) 
R-squared 0.771 0.705 0.632 
The contextual component equation     
Civil liberties  -0.099***   
 (0.011)   
Percentage of Protestant 0.001*   
 (0.000)   
Soviet dummy  -0.125***   
 (0.020)   
Extent of rent-seeking  0.055*** 0.025*** 
  (0.009) (0.006) 
Legal origins dummy: Socialist  0.016  
  (0.039)  
Legal origins dummy: French  0.017  
  (0.028)  
Legal origins dummy: English  0.055*  
  (0.033)  
Legal origins dummy: German  0.052*  
  (0.029)  
Political stability  0.038 0.023 
  (0.026) (0.023) 
Extent of fractionalization   0.071* 
    (0.041) 
R-squared 0.891 0.910 0.615 
Number of observations 25 25 25 
Notes: Standard errors in parentheses. 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 (two-tailed tests)
 Appendix A. Descriptive statistics for variables used in the analysis 
 
Variable Obs Mean SD Min Max 
Individual sample      
Social trust 47328 4.917 2.489 0.000 10.000 
Preference for leisure 43068 23.608 6.451 7.000 42.000 
General behavioral values 42520 19.085 5.654 7.000 42.000 
Altruism and sympathy with others 43057 15.833 4.628 7.000 42.000 
Others-regarding  46013 3.035 0.843 1.000 4.000 
Political institutions 47537 0.754 0.138 0.351 0.903 
Legal institutions 47537   0.746 0.142 0.440 0.930 
Regulatory institutions 47537 0.692 0.080 0.520 0.800 
Meeting friends 47345 4.883 1.607 1.000 7.000 
Born in the country 47442 0.917 0.276 0.000 1.000 
Paid job 47537 0.497 0.500 0.000 1.000 
Gender (Male =1) 47456 1.540 0.498 0.000 1.000 
Age 47264 44.165 18.456 10.000 100.000 
Years of education 46953 11.515 4.029 0.000 44.000 
Household income 36430 5.731 2.777 1.000 12.000 
Political trust 44056 22.861 10.280 0.000 50.000 
Aggregated sample      
Social trust 25 4.982 1.028 2.945   6.755 
Values combined 25 0.004 0.882 -1.853 1.651 
Countries' average for      
General behavioural values 25 19.265 2.068 14.004 22.707 
Altruism and sympathy with others  25 15.865 1.269 13.740 18.893 
Preference for leisure 25 23.512 1.489 20.840 26.199 
The interpersonal component  25 3.051 0.312 2.417 3.539 
Impact on social trust      
of general values  25 0.032 0.027 -0.048 0.082 
of altruism and sympathy with others  25 -0.035 0.030 -0.009 0.033 
of preference for leisure  25 0.008 0.022 -0.059 0.043 
of interpersonal component 25 0.291 0.149 0.006 0.640 
Share of female students 25 53.888 4.803 40.800 62.800 
Mother's level of education 25   1.877 0.626 0.457 2.759 
Perception of right and wrong 25 3.330 0.178 3.038 3.698 
Language fractionalization 25 0.256 0.207 0.010 0.640 
Unemployment rate 25 6.320 5.323 3.580 18.300 
Years of education 25 11.575 1.605 6.533 13.268 
Past experience with others   25   1.597 0.132 1.317 1.848 
Civil liberties 25 1.774 0.945 1.000 4.630 
Percentage of protestants 25 28.512   36.528 0.000 97.800 
Socialist dummy (Former socialist=1) 25 0.280 0.458 0.000 1.000 
Legal origins dummy: English 25 0.080 0.277 0.000 1.000 
Legal origins dummy: French 25 0.320 0.476 0.000 1.000 
Legal origins dummy: German 25 0.120 0.332 0.000 1.000 
Legal origins dummy: Socialist 25 0.280 0.458 0.000 1.000 
Political stability 25 0.874 0.537 -0.750 1.620 
Extent of rent-seeking 25   6.912 2.162 2.440 9.660 
Risk before social transfers  24 24.641 4.448 17.000 31.200 
Extent of lifelong learning 25 11.480 9.295 1.470 29.100 
Weekend job 25 2.602 0.269 2.258 3.356 
Percentage of Catholics  25 44.124 39.108 0.010 96.900 
Pay gap 23 18.026 5.988 7.700 30.300 
Extent of population ageing process  25 42.818 2.725 33.697 45.266 
  
Appendix B. Coefficient estimates for the key variables of the trust regression 
 
Countries 
The cultural variables 
The interpersonal 
component 
variable 
The general 
behavioral 
variable 
The altruism and 
sympathy with 
others variable 
The preference for 
leisure variable 
AT 0.059 -0.081 -0.001 0.259 
BE 0.040 -0.035 0.004 0.295 
CH 0.076 -0.088 0.015 0.418 
CZ 0.029 -0.060 0.023 0.128 
DE 0.046 -0.028 0.007 0.470 
DK 0.028 -0.045 0.018 0.640 
EE 0.005 -0.028 0.007 0.133 
ES 0.047 -0.025 -0.017 0.183 
FI 0.006 -0.028 0.007 0.226 
FR 0.038 -0.045 0.010 0.283 
GB 0.032 -0.024 0.017 0.311 
GR -0.048 -0.013 0.043 0.262 
HU 0.044 -0.065 0.043 0.253 
IE 0.018 -0.028 -0.008 0.036 
IS 0.034 -0.019 0.004 0.380 
LU -0.002 0.033 -0.020 0.375 
NL 0.042 -0.036 0.024 0.264 
NO 0.038 -0.035 0.007 0.518 
PL 0.011 -0.034 -0.016 0.388 
PT 0.031 0.011 -0.059 0.125 
SE 0.059 -0.004 -0.006 0.467 
SI 0.082 -0.064 0.025 0.365 
SK 0.027 -0.054 0.001 0.006 
TR 0.018 0.014 0.034 0.268 
UA 0.055 -0.090 0.041 0.245 
Note: The coefficient estimates are calculated by applying the model from Table 2 (Column 2). 
